Stabilizing monetary policy in a small open economy is constrained by the open economy trilemma. In a crisis this constraint may not allow the Central Bank to cut interest rates because this may cause significant capital flight and the ensuing problems. In this paper we investigate whether the Central Bank's credit rationing at the official rate (CROR) may soften the open economy trilemma constraint and improve the results of monetary policy for different monetary regimes. We construct a DSGE model appropriate for analysing the forward-looking behaviour of households facing a non-zero probability of credit rationing at the official rate. A simulation of estimated on a Russian data model and welfare optimization exercises allow us to contribute to the question of optimal monetary regime choice and to analyse the role of credit rationing for different monetary regimes.
Introduction
Foreign exchange rate dynamics are considered a constraint on monetary policy. The intensity of such constraints varies across monetary regimes from low, for floaters, to high, for fixers. Irrespective of the monetary regime, in a period of negative external shock the Central Bank should choose between a high official interest rate, a national currency devaluation, capital flight, and imposing restrictions on capital flows. All alternatives are painful for the real part of economy and Central Banks may try to find another solution. A possible alternative is credit rationing at the official rate (CROR) which may help the real sector with lower interest rates and prevent significant international reserves fall or/and national currency depreciation as a result of significant capital flight. On the other hand credit rationing could lead to an increase of risk premium and the forwardlooking behaviour of agents who would try to get more credit in advance.
In this paper we investigate whether the Central Bank's CROR may soften the open economy trilemma constraint (Obstfeld et al., 2005) and improve results of monetary policy for different monetary regimes. The paper also contributes to the optimal monetary regime choice for Russia which has used elements of credit rationing in monetary policy 3 . Credit rationing is a financial market imperfection which may be introduced into a model to explain a significant share of real sector volatility and refineing of monetary policy transmission and shock propagation mechanisms. Financial frictions make risk premium more pro-cyclical, cause shocks amplification, and increase the persistence of variables. In the papers of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) , Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) , Gertler and Karadi (2009) , and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) financial frictions arise as a result of restrictions on net worth of the firm. They also may be the result of monitoring costs as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) ; collateral constraints Kiyotaki and Moore (1995) and Monacelli (2009) ; or quantity rationing Waters (2013) and Boissay (2001) . All these papers assume that financial frictions originate from the interaction between private lenders and private borrowers while Central Banks should just take that feature into account in optimizing monetary policy design. In this paper we assume that credit rationing, as controlled by authorities, is a financial market imperfection which may help to improve monetary transmission mechanism.
To answer the questions raised above we elaborate the DSGE model to analyse the forwardlooking behaviour of households facing a non-zero probability of CROR. In the model we assume that in every period, some of the liquidity constrained households have no ability to make an intertemporal optimization of its consumption path after getting a random signal a la Calvo (1983) . We also assume that another random signal gives households access to financing at the official rate. Each household will have, with some probability: (1) no access to financial markets, (2) access to financing at an interest rate driven by foreign interest rates and a pro-cyclical risk premium, (3) access to Central Bank financing. Introducing liquidity constraints into the model allows the model to be customised to give a high correlation between consumption and current income. Introducing CROR provides a reasonable restriction on the independence of two monetary instruments and helps explain the pro-cyclical behaviour of risk premium, interest rates and consumption. In DSGE models the open economy trilemma constraint takes the form of the equation for risk premium as a function of the foreign indebtedness level (Benigno, 2001 , Adolfson et al., 2007 For example in the crises of 2008-2009 interbank interest rate was frequently higher than official (refinance) rate. Russian commercial banks faced with a lack of collateral instruments and had no ability to borrow needed volume of liquidity from Central Bank. To resolve the liquidity shortage problem authorities elaborated different facilities (Aleksashenko et al., 2011) and the most important one was uncollateralized lending auctions (ULA) conducted by Bank of Russia (BoR). Interest rate on the ULA was usually higher than interbank rate and demand always exceeded supply in a crises. So the volume of liquidity supplied through the ULA was controlled by BoR and was an important monetary policy instrument. To decrease speculative pressure on foreign exchange market BoR limited volume of liquidity supplied through the ULA. Other way BoR used ULA was the threat to reduce borrowing limits for commercial banks which speculate on foreign exchange market. Facing the probability of not getting financing through the ULA Russian banks behaved in forward-looking manner. Similar situation was in the foreign crediting boom of 2005-2007 when short-term interbank interest rate was far below refinance rate. BoR issued sterilizing facilities and chose the volume of sterilized liquidity due to the needs of its anti-inflationary policy. 2009 ). Escude (2013) demonstrated that in a model with such a constraint two optimal rules for systematic foreign exchange rate and interest rate policies help to improve household welfare. Shulgin (2015) found the same result for estimated on a Russian data DSGE model with two monetary policy rules: the Taylor rule and the exchange rate adjustment rule. Introducing CROR in the model will change the constraint on the two independent monetary policy instruments and will influence the results of welfare maximization exercises.
The main findings of the paper are as follows. A Bayesian estimation demonstrates that the introduction of liquidity constrained (non-Ricardian) households and CROR into the DSGE model is justified by Russian quarterly data of 2001-2014. The share of liquidity constrained (nonRicardian) households and the probability of CROR are estimated as 22% and 66%, respectively. Simulating a DSGE model with different values of coefficients in the Taylor rule, the exchange rate adjustment rule, and the credit rationing parameter allow welfare optimization exercises. The results demonstrate a trade off between low-inflation and high-welfare regimes. We have found that a floating regime appears to be the best solution for Russia for all the optimization exercises conducted. A welfare optimization over credit rationing parameter gives a mixed result. We found the optimal value of the probability of CROR in both the exchange rate-based and Taylor rulebased models. On the other hand the resulting improvement in welfare is very small.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the DSGE model for a small open economy with two independent monetary policy instruments and two types of credit rationing. In Section 3 we perform a calibration of the parameters which determine the steady state of the model and a Bayesian estimation of other parameters on the basis of a Russian de-seasoned detrended series: consumption, output, inflation, exchange rate, refinance rate, international reserves, risk premium, and commodity price. Section 4 presents the results of welfare optimization exercises. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
A small open economy is inhabited by a continuum of households indexed by ] 1 , 0 [  j . Households supply labour services in a monopolistically competitive market and make decisions on their consumption. Goods and services are produced by firms all belonging to the corresponding households. Intermediate manufactured (M), non-tradable (N) and imported goods and services are produced in monopolistically competitive markets, while commodity (X), final (Z) and capital goods are produced in perfectly competitive markets. The government decides on its spending t G and does not issue debt, maintaining zero budget deficits. The Central Bank manipulates interest and exchange rates simultaneously and performs CROR.
Households
Household j utility function is:
where  is the intertemporal discount factor;
 is the intertemporal preference shock which helps to account for unexplained volatility in consumption. All structural shocks t  in the model are expected to have zero mean and not expected to be iid processes.
Instantaneous utility is:
is the consumption of household j; 
where foreign risk free interest rate * t i is assumed to be an exogenous constant; risk premium ) ( j rp t depends on the foreign indebtedness level of household j, as in Adolfson et al. (2007) : 
Optimal financing decisions in a face of two types of credit rationing
As in many DSGE models constructed for developing economies (for example, Sosunov and Zamulin, (2007) for Russia) we assume that some of the liquidity constrained households have no ability to make an intertemporal optimization of their consumption path.
Let us assume that every household in every period gets two random signals about their ability to borrow/invest money in different financial market segments. The first signal reveals whether household j has the ability to optimize its consumption path using any financial market instrument. If it gets such signal (with the probability
) it may adjust some of its financial instruments: t B and/or * t B . With probability A  household j has to consume its current income and has no ability to smooth its consumption path. We label the last group 'liquidity constrained (nonRicardian)' households.
The second signal reveals whether household j has access to financing at the official (refinance) rate . Recurring in this way we find the expected utility of marginal consumption which should optimally be zero:
where the marginal utilities of consumption for optimizing and non-optimizing households are:
where o t C and n t C are the consumption levels for the two households types.
Rearranging (6) gives:
where
Aggregating consumption gives:
Non-optimizing households consume their current income:
where WD  is the share of exports withdrawn from exporters income and will be explained below; t G is the government spending level;
is the output in manufactured (M), nontradable (N) and commodity (X) sectors respectively;
is the price level in manufactured (M), non-tradable (N) and commodity (X) sectors respectively.
Equations (8)- (12) describe an incomplete smoothing of consumption and help explain the high correlation between consumption and current income variables.
Credit rationing at the official rate
We assume that in every period, with probability
, household j may have the ability to adjust its domestic asset volume to the optimal level . Foreign and domestic assets are substitutes for achieving the optimal level of financing t Fin which household j demands in period t. Changes in financing depend on the difference between current consumption and current income. For the households which received the signal to adjust their financing level (with probability
We use superscript o to refer the optimal levels of variables for households which have the ability to adjust both t B and * t B in period t. For households not having the ability to smooth their consumption path in period t (with probability
Fin .
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We use superscript opt to refer the levels of foreign and domestic assets for the case when a household may adjust its level of t B in every period. In that case marginal financing costs equal the official rate 
where (14) is the uncovered interest parity condition; and (15) and household j will bear the losses of deviation from the optimum. The loss function for household j, which cannot adjust ) ( j B t is: 
is expressed in terms of the domestic currency interest rate of foreign financing:
To calculate the loss function we find the Taylor series expansion of (17) around
Then the loss function is:
If the level of domestic and foreign assets in period t+k is still to be set in period t we have 
is the marginal utility of aggregated consumption.
The first order condition for (21) is:
 is the optimal foreign asset shock;
where:
Equations (22)- (26) , and is based on the expected devaluation rate as in the equation (17).
The rest of the model follows Dib (2008) and is presented in Appendix A.
The Central Bank
The Central Bank issues money t M and its own securities t B backed by international reserves: households issue securities bought by the Central Bank, which issues money backed by the securities. The Central Bank profit consists of interest on foreign and domestic assets and is fully transferred to the government:
As in Escudé (2013) , the Central Bank uses the two monetary policy instruments independently. It means that we have two independent monetary policy rules in the model.
The exchange rate adjustment rule is based on international reserve dynamics 4 :
where IR k is the coefficient of the exchange rate flexibility or the absolute value of the elasticity of the exchange rate with respect to international reserves; a stationary level of any endogenous variable t X is denoted by X ; t S ,  are the discretionary exchange rate policy shocks. The exchange rate augmented Taylor rule allows the Central Bank to stabilize the fluctuations of real variables, inflation and exchange rate:
where 0 , ,
is the discretionary component of the interest rate dynamics following AR(1) process:
is the official rate shock; PR  is the persistence parameter of the official rate dynamics.
The Central Bank uses CROR by making the probability of getting credit at the official rate less than one. This presumably helps correct the open economy trilemma constraint for better monetary policy performance. To show this we estimate the model and make welfare optimization exercises.
The Bayesian estimation
The model parameterization combines the calibration of the parameters which determine the steady state of the model and the Bayesian estimation of the parameters which determine the model dynamics and can be seen in de-trended data.
We calibrate the model on the basis of Russian macro-statistics. In Tab. A1 we demonstrate the empirical ratios needed for the steady state calculation. Other calibrated parameters are presented in Tab 
Priors
We use both informative and non-informative prior distributions for the estimated parameters. We use a Gamma-distribution for setting priors for the utility function parameters for the share of liquidity constrained (non-Ricardian) households. The usual practice is to set the prior mean for A  at 0.5, but in the model we have two types of credit rationing and the contribution of the liquidity constraint is less than in a model with only a liquidity constraint.
Vernikov (2009) 
Estimation results
First we estimate the Baseline model (M1) which includes both liquidity constraints (LC) and CROR blocks. To reveal the contribution of the LC and CROR blocks, and to check robustness we estimate three modifications of M1: a model which includes only the LC block (M2); the model which includes only the CROR block (M3); and the model which includes neither (M4).
The results of the posterior density function maximization for the four models M1-M4 are presented in Tab Models M3 and M4, without liquidity constrained households, are unable to explain the high historical correlation between consumption, and output and oil prices, while they better explain the correlations between the exchange rate and international reserves, and oil prices than models M1 and M2. The correlations calculated for M1 demonstrate a tradeoff between explaining the high correlations between consumption, and output and oil prices, and explaining the high correlations between the exchange rate and international reserves, and oil prices.
If we assume that the data are described by one of four models M1-M4 we can calculate posterior probabilities that the model Mj is true. Tab. 1 demonstrates that M1 with both the LC and CROR blocks strongly dominates other alternative models: 89.2% vs. 10.8% for M2-M4 together.
We can see impulse-response functions (IRF) for six endogenous variables, four shocks, and four models in Figs. A1-A4. IRF of consumption on all shocks in models M3 and M4 are much more smoothed than for M1 and M2. This fact agrees with the low correlation between consumption and the current income variables for models M3 and M4 (see Tab. 1). IRF of the exchange rate and international reserves for M1 are more persistent than for other models and this fact agrees with the lower mode of the exchange rate flexibility coefficient for M1 (see Tab. A3). The reaction of foreign assets to shocks for M1 is the most smoothed among all models.
All tests made for adequacy of the four model favour M1, so we use it in the welfare analysis. 
Welfare analysis and the optimal monetary regime
where the variable with tilde denotes the logarithmic deviation of the variable from its steady state value.
We make the decomposition of the unconditional expectation of utility on the level effect and stabilization (variance) effect as in Ambler et al. (2004) and Dib (2008) . Ambler et al. (2004) argue that we should use both effects in optimization, while Shulgin (2015) have demonstrated that the calculation of the level effect in a similar DSGE model is unstable for a small sample of historical data. We base the welfare optimization on the stabilization (variance) effect only, and for convenience express the results of the expected utility calculations in terms of compensative variation (CV) of deterministic consumption.
The main optimization criterion in terms of CV of the deterministic consumption v  is determined by: 
We cannot rely merely on the criteria (33), so we also take into account the second unconditional moments of inflation 2 t E and the foreign exchange rate 2 t ES . Both variances characterize price stability which may not be captured by the main criterion.
We first solve constrained optimization problem: The solution to problem (34) characterizes the optimal rules in an inflation targeting regime and demonstrates the ability to improve unconditional welfare. In an inflation targeting regime there can be a significant improvement in terms of the CV of deterministic consumption. We make three exercises 'E1-E3'. E1 assumes that coefficient S k has only the pro-cyclicality constraint 0  S k which appears to be binding. Internal optima for the coefficients are marked in bold in all tables. In E1-E3 we found internal optima for the Taylor rule coefficients The results are presented in Tab. 3. Table 3 . Results of welfare optimization over probability of rationing credit at official rate B  for the model with historical (estimated) coefficients in two monetary policy rules.
Parameter
Historical data and the Baseline M1 model
Model with optimal probability of rationing credit at official rate and historical (estimated) coefficients
Model with zero probability of rationing credit at official rate and historical (estimated) coefficients The most interesting result presented in Tab. 3 is the existence of an internal optimum for the probability of CROR We have included in Tab. 4 only regimes with appropriate exchange rate volatility 6 . The best value for the main criterion among the different regimes (+2.39%) is achieved in OTR, where the official rate reacts only to the output gap and does not react to inflation. Additional criteria for OTR are quite poor: much higher inflation and exchange rate volatility. FOR is a more balanced regime. It has a good improvement in terms of the main criterion (+1.82%) and low exchange rate volatility. Optimal inflation targeting (OIT) has a moderate improvement in terms of the main criterion (+1.22%) but lower inflation in comparison with OTR and FOR.
CTR demonstrates surprisingly poor performance. CTR gives higher volatilities of consumption, working hours, inflation and exchange rate in comparison with OIT and FOR. The main explanation is that the stabilizing effect of the official rate on inflation in the model starts with . FER has moderate inflation and a zero exchange rate volatility but a poor value for the main criterion (-0.27%). M1 outperforms FER in both welfare and inflation stability. Both M1 and FER have significant drawbacks in comparison with the other regimes: they are prone to exchange rate crises. In making all welfare calculations we did not take that into account. 6 For example not included in the table Taylor rule-based regime without reaction of official rate on foreign exchange rate ( 0  S k ) leads to near-unit-root behavior and huge volatility of exchange rate.
To make an additional check for the optimal probability of the CROR inference we performed optimization exercises for all the referenced regimes. The main finding is that the correction of the transmission mechanism made by changing B  may lead to an improvement of monetary policy performance in different monetary policy regimes (see Tabs. 3, 4) . This improvement is very small (+0.01% in terms of the main criterion) and hence the optimal monetary regime should not include CROR.
Conclusion
This paper investigates whether CROR performed by a Central Bank may soften the open economy trilemma constraint and improve results of monetary policy for different monetary regimes and contributes to the optimal monetary regime choice for Russia.
To answer the questions raised we elaborated a DSGE model analysed the forward-looking behaviour of households facing a non-zero probability of CROR. Introducing liquidity constraints into the model allows customizing the model to give a high correlation between consumption and current income. Introducing CROR into the model provides a reasonable restriction on the independence of the two monetary instruments and helps explain the pro-cyclical behaviour of risk premium, interest rates and consumption.
The Bayesian estimation of the model on Russian quarterly data from 2001-2014 empirically confirms the idea of including liquidity constraint and CROR blocks in the model. To demonstrate this we estimated four alternative models and, assuming that the data are described by the one of four models, we found that the posterior probability of the hypothesis 'the baseline model is true' is 89.2%. Posterior modes for the share of liquidity constrained (non-Ricardian) households and the probability of CROR were estimated at 22% and 66% respectively.
We simulated a DSGE model with different values for the coefficients in the Taylor rule, the exchange rate adjustment rule and the probability of CROR. To make welfare maximization exercises we decompose the unconditional expectation of utility for the level effect and stabilization (variance) effect. The results of the welfare optimization exercises and the calculations for different monetary regimes made on the basis of the estimated DSGE model demonstrate the trade-off between low-inflation and high-welfare regimes. We found the local optimum with relatively high Taylor rule coefficients and relatively low inflation volatility (OIT). The other local optimum (OTR) has better welfare criterion but much higher inflation and exchange rate volatilities. Between the two local optima we found an intermediate solution in terms of welfare and inflation with no reaction of the official rate to inflation and output gap (FER). CTR demonstrates a surprisingly poor performance.
We found that a floating regime appears to be the best exchange rate regime for Russia in all optimization exercises. This is in contrast with the results of Shulgin (2015) which, on the basis of a similar DSGE model without financial imperfections, demonstrated the need for exchange rate smoothing for better monetary policy performance.
Welfare optimization over the credit rationing parameter gives a mixed result. We found the optimal value for the probability of CROR for the model with a historical (estimated) coefficient as 15%. The same exercise for the model with the Classic Taylor rule gives the optimal value as 20%. However the resulting improvement in welfare was very small and we also did not find an internal optimum for that parameter for other regimes. We therefore infer that the optimal monetary regime should not include credit rationing at the official rate. Abandoning that controversial element from Russian monetary policy practice could bring Russia welfare a gain of 0.15% in terms of deterministic consumption. 
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Appendix A. Model
Investments and labour supply
The capital dynamics of the intermediate good sectors
are given by: 
is the marginal utility of consumption; is the aggregated wage in each sector.
Household j chooses the optimal wage according to the Calvo (1983) model with indexation as in Yun (1996) . It gets a random signal to adjust the wage from previous level ) ( 
is the degree of wage indexation.
Aggregation of all households' decisions gives:
Maximizing the expected discounted value of the utility function (1) subject to labour demand equations (34) gives three optimal conditions:
are the shares of natural resource owner income, capital owner income and worker income in the total commodity sector income respectively 7 .
Natural resource supply is absolutely inelastic: L L t  , while demand for the country's commodity export is absolutely elastic because of the small open economy assumption. The domestic commodity price is
, where the world commodity price * ,t X P follows AR(1) process:
is the commodity price shock. First order conditions for commodity producer are:
Equations (A11)-(A13) define the demand functions for resources used in the X-sector production function. The perfect competition assumption implies zero profit in the X-sector 0 ,  D .
The produced commodity goods
, at world commodity price
We assume Calvo-Yun pricing with indexation on the previous rate of inflation. Firm k gets a random signal to adjust its price to the optimal level ) ( , k P o t z with probability  
1
. If firm k does not get such signal it indexes the previous period price on the previous rate of inflation
is the degree of price indexation. The aggregate real price level in both sectors is
Profit of monopolistic competitor k in both sectors in period t+l, subject to price
, is set in period t and is indexed until the period t+l:
, and t N Y , follow from the optimization of the final goods production.
Imported goods production
The continuum of importing firms (F-sector) 
acquire homogeneous goods from abroad at price * t P and produce a unit of differentiated good from a unit of homogeneous good with zero costs. Importer k is the monopolistic competitor choosing price ) ( , k P t F to maximize the expected utility of a household. Demand for importer k is: 
are the aggregated output and the aggregated price level in F-sector, respectively.
As in other sectors with monopolistic competition we assume Calvo-Yun pricing with indexation on the previous rate of inflation. Parameter
is the probability of getting signal of price adjustment while ) 1 , 0 (   is the degree of price indexation. The aggregated real price level in F-sector is:
Profit of importer k in period t+l subject to price )
is set in period t and is just indexed until the period t+l:
The first order conditions for the optimization problem of importer k 
where 0   is the elasticity of the substitution of inputs in the production function;
assign the shares of sectors M, N and F in domestic consumption, respectively.
First order conditions for representative firm in Z-sector define demands for inputs:
and (A37)
is the consumer price index.
where M P , N P and X P are stationary levels of prices in the manufactured, non-tradable and commodity sectors, respectively.
Balance of payments equation in the model is:
where WD  is the share of exports withdrawn from exporter income which helps to account for all outflows from foreign exchange markets other than import, foreign assets and international reserve purchases. In the data the main component of withdrawals is a suspicious transaction with capital, so it is natural to model withdrawals as a share of exports, which is the main source of foreign capital inflow. Table A1 . Empirical ratios used to calculate the steady state of the model
Appendix B. Estimation
Calibrated values
Ratio Equation in the model Value
Government spending to GDP ratio 
Share of commodity export in total export
where the sensitivity of the risk premium to the indebtedness level  is estimated.
We normalize the following steady state values for the real and nominal parts of domestic and foreign economies: 
